_______________________________________________________________ | | The Herman-Chomsky progaganda model | http://www-trees.slu.se/newsl/40/40etc.pdf | | | | | Forests, Trees and People | Newsletter No. 40/41 | December 1999 / January 2000 71 | | A quick guide to the `propaganda model' by Dan Josefsson | | | In their book Manufacturing Consent - The Political Economy | of the Mass Media, (Pantheon, 1988, USA) Noam Chomsky and | Edward S. Herman claim that propaganda is not primarily | something used in dictatorships to make people believe what | the power-holders want. In dictatorships, the two | researchers say, the elite stays in power through violence | and acts of reprisal, and propaganda is not a determining | factor. Instead, it is the power- holders in democracies who | most need propaganda. | | In a democracy it is theoretically possible for the | majority of the population through their votes to bring | about changes which do not favour those with most power and | resources. | | Therefore, propaganda serves the important purpose of | inducing the population not to use its power. | | In the 412-page book, the two researchers present the so | called propaganda model, which is a detailed theory on the | process of turning critical journalists into propagandists | who safeguard the interests of the elite - often without | knowing it themselves. | | Chomsky and Herman name five filters which effectively | remove news that could threaten the current societal order | and thereby the interests of the elite in the USA. These | filters are equally applicable to Swedish conditions. | | The propaganda model has caused some journalists to | accuse Chomsky and Herman of believing in conspiracy. These | journalists have argued that there are no secret rooms where | the editorial boards decide what the journalists may and may | not cover in their reports. | | According to them, the journalists decide themselves what to | write. But anyone who actually reads Manufacturing Consent | soon realises that Chomsky and Herman have never claimed | that the elite would need to conspire behind closed doors in | order to stop unwelcome news. The propaganda model works | very well without this. | | | | The five filters of the Propaganda Model: | | 1: Concentration of ownership and profit orientation of the | mass media | | The media are run as businesses with a primary motive to | create profit for their owners. Hence, they can never | seriously criticise the power of the market or threaten | large capital owners - that would mean threatening their own | owners. | | | 2: The advertising licence to do business | | Since most media are dependent on advertising, ideas which | seriously threaten the consumption society can never be | spread through these media. The advertisers' choices thus | influence media prosperity and survival. The ad-based media | are also given a price-marketing-quality edge, which allows | them to further encroach on and weaken their ad-free rivals. | | | 3: The dependence on sources | | Since news is a tradable good, which must be produced fast | at as low a price as possible, news journalists are | dependent on co-operative sources that can quickly provide | them with information. This leads to the development of | symbiotic relationships with powerful institutions in the | market and in politics. The journalist who exposes | weaknesses risks losing his or her contacts, which makes it | difficult for him/her to do a good job. | | | 4: 'Flak' and the enforcers | | Journalists who report in a way which threatens economic or | political power holders in society can also become the | target of threatening and costly counter-attacks. For | instance, a journalist in Sweden who writes critically about | nuclear power can count on angry phone calls from people | employed in the nuclear power lobby. Even if the journalist | him/herself can deal with this, it may induce a hesitant | editor-in-chief to clamp down on reporting that elicits | criticism. Flak can also mean outright reprisals against | journalists. [Note: `Flak' is the word for anti- aircraft | gunfire in a war.] | | | 5: Uncritical belief in market liberalism/anti-communism as | control mechanism | | In the USA, it was possible for many years to use the fear | for communism to also suppress ideas which were not related | to communism. | | After the fall of the Soviet Union, anti-communism has | partly been replaced by a blind belief in the free market as | the ultimate organising principle for society, and this in | turn guides the choice of news. In Sweden, during the past | few years we see the same pattern evolving. Economic | journalists are unable to see the deficiencies and risks | inherent in the global capitalist system of today. Hence, | their articles become propaganda for a system of which most | readers are probably more or less critical. | | | | In the book, the following is said among other things | regarding the working conditions of journalists: | | ``There are also real advantages in conformity beyond the | rewards and privilege that it yields. If one chooses to | denounce Qaddafi, or the Sandinistas, or the PLO, or the | Soviet Union, no credible evidence is required. The same is | true if one repeats conventional doctrines about our own | society and its behavior - say, that the US government is | dedicated to our traditional noble commitment to democracy | and human rights. But a critical analysis of American | institutions, the way they function domestically and their | international operations, must meet far higher standards; in | fact, standards are often imposed that can barely be met in | the natural sciences. One has to work hard, to produce | evidence that is credible, to construct serious arguments, | to present extensive documentation - all tasks that are | superfluous as long as one remains within the | presuppositional framework of the doctrinal consensus. It is | small wonder that few are willing to undertake the effort, | quite apart from the rewards that accrue to conformity and | the costs of honest dissidence. | | There are other considerations that tend to induce | obedience. A journalist or commentator who does not want to | have to work too hard can survive, even gain respectability, | by publishing information (official or leaks) from standard | sources; these opportunities may well be denied to those who | are not content to relay the constructions of state | propaganda as fact. The technical structure of the media | virtually compels adherence to conventional thoughts; | nothing else can be expressed between two commercials, or in | seven hundred words, without the appearance of absurdity | that is difficult to avoid when one is challenging familiar | doctrine with no opportunity to develop facts or argument.'' | | I believe many journalists around the world will recognise | the situation described above. | | The challenge remains for all of us. | | _ _ _ | | Dan Josefsson once worked as a journalist at the Swedish | magazine ETC where this article was originally published. | | Text © Dan Josefsson . Published here | with permission from the author. Contact the author for | permission to reprint! The article was also published in | the media-critical anthology "Välkommen till Dramafabriken" | (Ordfront 2002) that was edited by Dan. ( One of the | articles in that anthology has the same title as the book, | and Swedish readers are recommended to read it here: | http://josefsson.net/arkiv/980801_dj_dramafabriken.html ) | | | A version of the present article suitable for email can be | downloaded here: | http://propaganda.lege.net/model/herman_chomsky.txt | | A pdf version of the present article can be downloaded here: | http://propaganda.lege.net/model/herman_chomsky.pdf |______________________________________________________________