_______________________________________________________________ | | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War, October 2, 2003 | Report by PIPA/KN | http://propaganda.lege.net/misperceptions/report/ | | | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Media_10_02_03_Report.pdf | | | ____________________________________________________________ | cover | | | THE PIPA/KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS POLL | | THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES | | | | MISPERCEPTIONS, THE MEDIA AND THE IRAQ WAR | | | October 2, 2003 | | | PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR | | STEVEN KULL | | | RESEARCH STAFF | | CLAY RAMSAY | STEFAN SUBIAS | EVAN LEWIS | PHILLIP WARF | | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES (PIPA) | | A joint program of the Center on Policy Attitudes and the | Center for International and Security Studies at the | University of Maryland | | | KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS | | A polling, social science, and market research firm based in | Menlo Park, California | | | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | | | PIPA Board of Advisors | | I.M. Destler | University of Maryland | | Alan Kay | Americans Talk | Issues Foundation | | Robert Shapiro | Columbia University | | Gloria Duffy | Commonwealth Club | | Catherine Kelleher | US Naval War College | | Fred Steeper | Market Strategies | | Bill Frenzel | Brookings Institution | | Anthony Lake | Georgetown University | | Daniel Yankelovich | Public Agenda Foundation | | Alexander George | Stanford University | | Benjamin Page | Northwestern University | | | | The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) is a | joint program of the Center for International and Security | Studies at Maryland and the Center on Policy Attitudes. PIPA | undertakes research on American attitudes in both the public | and in the policymaking community toward a variety of | international and foreign policy issues. It seeks to | disseminate its findings to members of government, the | press, and the public as well as academia. | | Knowledge Networks is a polling, social science, and market | research firm based in Menlo Park, California. Knowledge | Networks uses a large-scale nationwide research panel which | is randomly selected from the national population of | households having telephones and is subsequently provided | internet access for the completion of surveys (and thus is | not limited to those who already have internet access). | | The Center for International and Security Studies at | Maryland (CISSM), at the University of Maryland's School for | Public Affairs, pursues policy-oriented scholarship on major | issues facing the United States in the global arena. Using | its research, forums, and publications, CISSM links the | University and the policy community to improve communication | between scholars and practitioners. | | The Center on Policy Attitudes (COPA) is an independent | non-profit organization of social science researchers | devoted to increasing understanding of public and elite | attitudes shaping contemporary public policy. Using | innovative research methods, COPA seeks not only to examine | overt policy opinions or positions, but to reveal the | underlying values, assumptions, and feelings that sustain | opinions. | | Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, Evan Lewis and Phil Warf designed | the questionnaires and wrote the analysis. | | Knowledge Network's Stefan Subias adapted the questionnaires | and managed the fielding of the polls. | | Trent Perrotto, Meredith Perry, Roman Gershkovich and | Batsuuri Haltar contributed to the production of the report. | | The search of existing poll data was done with the aid of | the Roper POLL database. | | This study was made possible by grants from the Rockefeller | Brothers Fund and the Ford Foundation. | | | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 1 | | | INTRODUCTION | | From January through September 2003, PIPA/Knowledge Networks | conducted seven different polls that dealt with the conflict | with Iraq. Among other things, PIPA/KN probed respondents | for key perceptions and beliefs as well for their attitudes | on what US policy should be. In the course of doing this, | it was discovered that a substantial portion of the public | had a number of misperceptions that were demonstrably false, | or were at odds with the dominant view in the intelligence | community. | | In the January poll it was discovered that a majority | believed that Iraq played an important role in 9/11 and that | a minority even expressed the belief that they had seen | "conclusive evidence" of such involvement. The US | intelligence community has said that there is not evidence | to support the view that Iraq was directly involved in | September 11 and there has clearly never been any observable | "conclusive evidence." | | In February, by providing more fine-grained response options | it became clearer that only about one in five Americans | believed that Iraq was directly involved in 9/11, but that a | majority did believe that Iraq had given substantial support | to al-Qaeda--both propositions unsupported by the US | intelligence community. Other polls found even higher | numbers responding positively to the idea that Iraq was | involved in September 11 or had some type of close | involvement with al-Qaeda. These perceptions of Iraq's | involvement with al-Qaeda and 9/11 persisted largely | unchanged in numerous PIPA/KN polls through September 2003, | despite continued disconfirmation by the intelligence | community. | | More striking, in PIPA/KN polls conducted after the war--in | May, July, and August-September--approximately half of the | respondents expressed the belief that the US has actually | found evidence in Iraq that Saddam was working closely with | al-Qaeda. While administration figures have talked about a | purported meeting in Prague between an al-Qaeda member and | an Iraqi official, this does not constitute evidence that | Saddam was working closely with al-Qaeda and, in any case, | this purported meeting had been discredited by the US | intelligence community during the period of these polls. | | One of the most striking developments in the postwar period | was that once US forces arrived in Iraq, they failed to find | the weapons of mass destruction that had been a major | rationale for going to war with Iraq. Nonetheless, in | PIPA/KN polls conducted May through September, a substantial | minority of the public said they believed that weapons of | mass destruction had been found. A substantial minority even | believed that Iraq had used weapons of mass destruction in | the war. Polls from other organizations repeated these | questions and got similar results. | | In polls conducted throughout the world before and during | the war, a very clear majority of world public opinion | opposed the US going to war with Iraq without UN approval | (see page 8 for details). However, PIPA/KN found in polls | conducted during and after the war that only a minority of | Americans were aware of this. A significant minority even | believed that a majority of people in the world favored the | US going to war with Iraq. Other perceptions of European | public opinion and Islamic public opinion also contradicted | numerous polls. | | | These striking findings raised numerous questions: | | * How widespread are these misperceptions? Are they | clustered in a constant minority or does a | majority have at least one key misperception? | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 2 | | | * How have these misperceptions related to support | for the decision to go to war and subsequently? | | * Do these misperceptions vary according to whether | they get their news from print media or a | particular television network? | | * Is the problem that Americans simply do not pay | enough attention to the news? If they pay more | attention, does this reduce the likelihood of | misperceptions? Does this vary according to their | news source? | | * Is the problem one of bias--of one seeking out | information to confirm political predilections? | Do levels of misperception vary according to party | identification or feelings about President Bush? | | To answer these and other questions we developed a more | systematic set of questions that were included in a series | of three polls, conducted over June through September, with | a total of 3,334 respondents. This was combined with the | findings from four other polls conducted January through May | for a total data set of 8634 respondents. | | The polls were fielded by Knowledge Networks using its | nationwide panel, which is randomly selected from the entire | adult population and subsequently provided internet access. | For more information about this methodology, go to | http://knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/ | | Funding for this research was provided by the Rockefeller | Brothers Fund and the Ford Foundation. | | | | FINDINGS | | | Misperceptions Related to the Iraq War | | In the run-up to the war with Iraq and in the postwar | period, a significant portion of the American public has | held a number of misperceptions that have played a key role | in generating and maintaining approval for the decision to | go to war. Significant portions of the public have believed | that Iraq was directly involved in the September 11 attacks | and that evidence of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda have | been found, that weapons of mass destruction were found in | Iraq after the war and that Iraq actually used weapons of | mass destruction during the war, and that world public | opinion has approved of the US going to war with Iraq. | While, in most cases only a minority has any particular | misperception, a large majority has at least one key | misperception. | | In the run-up to the war with Iraq and in the post-war | period, a significant portion of the American public has | held a number of misperceptions that, as we will see, are | highly related to support for the decision to go to war. | While in most cases only a minority has any particular | misperception, a very strong majority has at least one key | misperception. | | | Links Between Iraq and Al Qaeda | | Though the consensus view in the intelligence community is | that Saddam Hussein was not directly involved in September | 11 and was not even working closely with al-Qaeda, in the | months before the war numerous polls found significant | majorities who believed that there was a link between Iraq | and al-Qaeda, and that Iraq was directly involved in | September 11. In the January PIPA/KN poll 68% expressed the | belief that Iraq played an important role in September 11, | with 13% even expressing the clearly mistaken belief that | "conclusive evidence" of such a link had been found. | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 3 | | | We were concerned that when only given the two options of | saying that Iraq was involved in September 11 or not, some | respondents might respond affirmatively when they only | believed that there was some link, but not necessarily | direct Iraqi involvement in September 11. Thus in February | we offered respondents four options for describing "the | relationship between the Iraqi government under Saddam | Hussein and the terrorist group al-Qaeda." Indeed, only 20% | chose the option that "Iraq was directly involved in | carrying out the September 11th attacks." Another 36% chose | the position that "Iraq gave substantial support to | al-Qaeda, but was not involved in the September 11th | attacks" ­still a position at odds with the dominant view of | the intelligence community, but less egregiously so. | Twenty-nine percent chose the position that has some | evidence in support of it, that "a few al-Qaeda individuals | visited Iraq or had contact with Iraqi officials." Just 7% | chose the option, "There was no connection at all." | | Since the war has ended this perception has been essentially | unchanged. Despite the fact that no evidence of any links | has been found, the percentages choosing each position have | remained statistically constant, varying only within a few | percentage points. | | | Perceived Iraq-Al Qaeda Relationship | | (June ­ Sept 03) | | Iraq was directly involved in carrying out the | September 11th attacks | XXXXXXXXXXX 22% | | Iraq gave substantial support to al-Qaeda, but was | not involved in the September 11th attacks | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 35% | | Total direct/substantial Iraq involvement in the | September 11th attacks | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 57% | | A few al-Qaeda individuals visited Iraq or had | contact with Iraqi officials | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 30% | | There was no connection at all | XXX 7% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Other polls have continued to find even higher numbers | responding positively to the idea that Iraq was involved in | September 11, or had some type of close involvement with | al-Qaeda. However, not all of these responses should be | taken as an indication that the respondents have come to | that conclusion. A widely noted August Washington Post poll | asked, "How likely is it that Saddam Hussein was personally | involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks? Would you | say that it is very likely, somewhat likely, not very | likely, or not at all likely?" Thirty-two percent said it | was very likely and another 37% said it was somewhat likely. | This has led to a widely-repeated statement that 7 in 10 | Americans believe that Saddam Hussein was personally | involved in September 11. However, it should be noted that | when respondents say that something is likely--especially | those who just say that it is somewhat likely--it does not | mean they have come to the conclusion that it is the case. | | | Saddam Hussein and 9/11 | | Washington Post (Aug 03) | | How likely is it that Saddam Hussein was personally | involved in the September 11th Terrorist attacks? | | Very likely | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 32% | | Somewhat likely | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 37% | | Not very likely | XXXXXX 12% | | Not at all likely | X 3% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | A more recent September 19-21 CNN/USA Today poll asked: "Do | you think Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 4 | | | September 11th terrorist attacks, or not?" Forty-three | percent said they thought he was, down from 51% when asked | in March 2003. But here again it should be noted that | respondents had only the two options of saying he was or was | not personally involved in the September 11th attacks. The | responses to the PIPA/KN question with four options suggests | that some of those who responded affirmatively may have | believed that the link was not as direct as the question | says, but still answered affirmatively because they believed | there was some kind of link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. | | | Evidence of Links to al-Qaeda | | Perhaps the most striking misperception is the belief that, | not only were there links between Saddam Hussein and | al-Qaeda, but that actual evidence has been found. PIPA/KN | asked in May, July, and August-September: "Is it your | impression that the US has or has not found clear evidence | in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working closely with the | al-Qaeda terrorist organization?" In every case, large | percentages (45-52%) said that such evidence has been found. | | | Perception: Evidence of Iraqi-Al Qaeda Link Found | | Is it your impression that the US has or has not | found clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein | was working closely with the al Qaeda terrorist | organization? | | US has | | Cumulative | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 48% | | 9/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 49% | | 7/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 45% | | 6/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 52% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Harris Interactive asked a similar question in June and | August and found similar results. | | | Asked in June, "Do you believe clear evidence that Iraq was | supporting al-Qaeda has been found in Iraq or not?" 52% said | that clear evidence had been found, with just 43% saying | that it had not and 5% not sure. Despite intensive | discussion of the issue in the press, in August the numbers | were essentially the same: 49% believed evidence had been | found, 45% believed that it had not been and 6% were unsure. | | | Weapons of Mass Destruction | | Before the war overwhelming majorities believed Iraq had | weapons of mass destruction. Though it now appears this | belief may have been incorrect, it does not seem appropriate | to call this a misperception because it was so widespread at | the time, even within the intelligence community. | [Editorial comment: This is not true outside the U.S.. | Outside the U.S. the perception was widespread that the U.N. | inspection regime had in fact been very successful, and that | it was unlikely that the intelligence community had any | evidence, or the evidence would have been presented to the | weapons inspectors. So what the report is saying is that if | a whole country shares a misperception it is not a | misperception!!! -- Leif Erlingsson] | | However, a striking misperception occurred after the war, | when the US failed to find any weapons of mass destruction | or even any solid evidence of a WMD program. | | PIPA/KN first asked in May whether respondents thought that | the US has or has not "found Iraqi weapons of mass | destruction" in Iraq, and 34% said the US had (another 7% | did not know). In June, Harris Interactive subsequently | asked "Do you believe clear evidence of weapons of mass | destruction have been found in Iraq or not?" and 35% said | that it had. | | PIPA/KN asked again in late June--during a period with much | discussion in the press about the absence of WMD--and found | that the percentage holding this belief had dropped to 23%. | This number then stayed roughly the same in July and early | September (21% and 24%). In late July, NBC/Wall Street | Journal asked whether the US has been successful in "finding | evidence of weapons of mass destruction," and 22% said that | it had. Harris asked again in mid- | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 5 | | | August and found 27% saying that evidence of WMD had been | found. | | | Perception: Weapons of Mass Destruction Have Been | Found | | Since the war with Iraq ended, is it your impression | that the US has or has not found Iraqi weapons of | mass destruction? | | US has | | Cumulative | XXXXXXXXXXX 22% | | 9/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXX 24% | | 7/03 | XXXXXXXXXX 21% | | 6/03 | XXXXXXXXXXX 23% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Americans have also incorrectly believed that Iraq actually | used weapons of mass destruction in the recent war with the | US. PIPA/KN asked respondents whether "Iraq did or did not | use chemical or biological weapons in the war that had just | ended." In May, 22% of respondents said that it had. In | mid-June, ABC/Washington Post asked "do you believe that | Iraq did or did not use chemical or biological weapons | against U.S. troops during the war earlier this year?" and | 24% said that that they thought it had. When asked by | PIPA/KN again in August-September, the percentage saying | that Iraq had used such weapons slipped only slightly to | 20%. | | | Perception: Chemical and Biological Weapons Have | Been Used | | Is it your impression that Iraq did or did not use | chemical or biological weapons in the war that just | ended? | | Iraq did use chemical and biological weapons | | 9/03 | XXXXXXXXXX 20% | | 5/03 | XXXXXXXXXXX 22% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | World Public Opinion | | Americans have misperceived world public opinion on the US | decision to go to war and the way that the US is generally | dealing with the problem of terrorism. This has been true | during and after the war and applies to perceptions about | world public opinion as a whole, European public opinion, | and public opinion in the Muslim world. [See p. 8 for | international poll results showing actual world public | opinion.] | | In March 2003, shortly after the war started, PIPA/KN asked | respondents "How all of the people in the world feel about | the US going to war with Iraq." Respondents perceived | greater support for the war than existed at the time, or has | since. Only 35% perceived correctly that the majority of | people opposed the decision. Thirty-one percent expressed | the mistaken assumption that views were evenly balanced on | the issue, and another 31% expressed the egregious | misperception that the majority favored it. | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 6 | | | Asked again in June, July, and August-September, these | viewed changed very little. Only 38-42% knew that the | majority of people opposed the US going to war with Iraq, | while 30-33% believed that views were evenly balanced and | 24-27% said that the majority of people favored it. The | cumulative rate for the three months is depicted below. | | | Perception: World Public Opinion on War With Iraq | | (June ­ Sept 03) | | Thinking about how all the people in the world feel | about the US having gone to war with Iraq, do you | think: | | The majority of people favor the US having gone to | war | XXXXXXXXXXXX 25% | | Views are evenly balanced | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 31% | | Total majority or evenly balanced opinion | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 56% | | The majority of people oppose the US having gone to | war | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 41% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Perceptions have been a bit more accurate when it comes to | perceiving European public opinion, but still there are | widespread misperceptions. Asked in June and | August-September nearly half (48 to 49%) correctly said that | the "majority of people oppose the US having gone to war." | But 29-30% believed incorrectly that views are evenly | balanced and 18% have believed that the majority even favors | it. | | | Perception: European Public Opinion on War With Iraq | | (June and Sept 03) | | Thinking about how people in Europe feel about the | US having gone to war with Iraq, do you think: | | The majority of people favor the US having gone to | war | XXXXXXXX 17% | | Views are evenly balanced | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 30% | | Total majority or evenly balanced opinion | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 47% | | The majority of people oppose the US having gone to | war | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 50% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | A substantial number of Americans also misperceive attitudes | in the Islamic world toward US efforts to fight terrorism | and its policies in the Middle East. Respondents were asked | in August-September whether they thought "a majority of | people in the Islamic world favor or oppose US-led efforts | to fight terrorism." A plurality of 48% incorrectly assumed | that a majority of Islamic people favor US led efforts to | fight terrorism" while 46% assumed that they do not. When | asked whether respondents thought "a majority of people in | the Islamic world think US policies in the Middle East make | the region" more or less stable, 35% incorrectly assumed | that the majority of people in the Islamic world feel that | US policies make the region more stable, while 60% perceived | attitudes correctly. | | | Composite Analysis | | Most specific misperceptions are held by a minority of | respondents. However, this does not tell us if these | misperceptions are held by the same minority, or if large | percentages have at least one misperception. To find out, | we repeated three key perception questions over three polls, | conducted in | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 7 | | | June, July, and August-September with 3,334 respondents. | | | The three key perception questions used were the ones that | found the most egregious misperceptions, and to qualify as a | misperception the most extreme form of the misperception was | used. These were the beliefs that: | | * Evidence of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda have | been found | | * Weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq | | * World public opinion favored the US going to war | with Iraq | | To determine the pervasiveness of misperceptions, we focused | on the 1,362 respondents that heard all three perception | questions. | | Misperceptions were not limited to a small minority that had | repeated misperceptions. A majority of 60% had at least one | of these three unambiguous misperceptions, and only 30% had | no misperceptions. (Another 10% just had the more modest | misperception that world public opinion was evenly balanced | between support and opposition to the Iraq war.) Thirty-two | percent had just one of the misperceptions (and no more), | 20% had two of the misperceptions and just 8% had all three | of the misperceptions. | | | Frequency of Misperceptions | | Evidence of Links to al-Qaeda, WMD Found, World | Public Opinion Favorable | | No misperception | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 30% | | Global attitudes are "evenly balanced" | XXXXX 10% | | Total non-extreme misperceptions | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 40% | | 1 [unambiguous] misperception | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 32% | | 2 [unambiguous] misperceptions | XXXXXXXXXX 20% | | 3 [unambiguous] misperceptions | XXXX 8% | | Total one or more [unambiguous] misperceptions | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 60% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 8 | | | POLLS OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION ON THE IRAQ WAR | | International polling strongly suggests that the majority of | world public opinion was opposed to the US taking military | action as it did, without UN approval. Gallup International | conducted two international polls (in January and April-May | 2003) and Pew Research Center conducted one (in April-May | 2003) which included poll questions that directly measured | support or opposition to the Iraq war. In the three polls | taken together, 56 countries were surveyed. [ For more | details see http://www.gallup-international.com/ and | http://people-press.org/ .] | | The January Gallup International poll asked, "Are you in | favor of military action against Iraq: under no | circumstances; only if sanctioned by the United Nations; | unilaterally by America and its allies?" Of the 38 countries | polled (including 20 in Europe), not a single one showed | majority support for unilateral action and in nearly every | case the percentage was very low. Gallup International also | asked, "If military action goes ahead against Iraq, do you | think [survey country] should or should not support this | action?" In 34 of the 38 countries polled (17 out of 20 in | Europe), a majority opposed having their country support | this action. | | In April-May Gallup International asked "Now that the regime | of Saddam Hussein has been destroyed, do think that military | action by the US and its allies was justified or not | justified?" Here responses were a bit more mixed. In 27 of | the 43 (11 out of 21 in Europe) countries polled the | majority said military action was not justified, while in | seven countries (three in Europe) the majority said that it | was. (Some respondents may have felt the war was justified, | but still opposed the US taking such action without UN | approval.) | | In April-May the Pew Global Attitudes Survey asked | respondents in 18 countries how they felt about their | country's decision to participate or not participate in | "us[ing] military force against Iraq." Among the 13 | countries that had not participated, in every case, a large | to overwhelming majority approved of the decision. For the | three countries that contributed troops, in the UK and | Australia a majority approved; in Spain a majority was | opposed. For the two countries that had allowed the US to | use bases, in Kuwait the majority approved; in Turkey the | majority was opposed. | | | Misperceptions of Attitudes in the Islamic World | | The Pew Global Attitudes survey in summer 2002 and May 2003 | asked in seven countries with primarily Muslim populations | (Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, and | Morocco, plus the Palestinian Authority): "Which of the | following phrases comes closer to your view? I favor the | US-led efforts to fight terrorism, or I oppose the US-led | efforts to fight terrorism." In six of the eight cases | strong majorities--ranging from 56-85% in summer 2002, and | rising to 67-97% in May 2003--said they opposed "US-led | efforts to fight terrorism." In only one case--Kuwait in | May 2003--did a majority say they favored US efforts. In | the case of Pakistan, a plurality of 45% opposed US efforts | in the summer of 2003, rising to 74% in May 2003. | | The Pew Global Attitudes survey in May 2003 asked: "Do you | think US policies in the Middle East make the region more | stable or less stable?" In six of the eight cases, | majorities said that US policies in the Middle East make the | region less stable. These majorities ranged from 56% in | Lebanon to 91% in Jordan. In Pakistan, 43% said US policies | make the Middle East less stable, but another 43% said US | policies either "made no difference" (12%) or that they did | not know (31%). In Kuwait a 48% plurality said US policies | made the Middle East more stable. | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 9 | | | Misperceptions and Support for War | | Before and after the war, those who have held misperceptions | have been far more supportive of the decision to go to war | with Iraq. In the postwar period, those with none of the | key misperceptions oppose the decision, while the presence | of each additional misperception is accompanied by sharply | higher support for the war. | | The misperceptions about the war discussed above appear to | be highly related to attitudes about the decision to go to | war, both before and after the war. In every case those who | have the misperception have been more supportive of the war. | As we will see in the composite analysis of the three key | misperceptions, those with none of the key misperceptions | have opposed the decision, while the presence of each | additional misperception has gone together with sharply | higher support. | | | Links to al-Qaeda | | Before the war, those who believed that Iraq was directly | involved in September 11 showed greater support for going to | war even without multilateral approval. In a January PIPA/KN | poll, among those who wrongly believed that they had "seen | conclusive evidence" that "Iraq played an important role in | September 11th attacks," 56% said they would agree with a | decision by the President to proceed to go to war with Iraq | if the UN Security Council refused to endorse such an | action. Among those who said they had not seen such | evidence but still believed it was true that Iraq was | involved in September 11, 42% said they would support such a | decision. Among those who said they had not seen such | evidence and were not convinced that it was true, only 9% | said they would agree with such a decision. | | In a February PIPA/KN poll, support for going to war was | high among those who believed that Saddam Hussein was | directly involved in September 11 and was progressively | lower as the perceived link between Iraq and al Qaeda became | more tenuous. Among those who believed that Iraq was | directly involved in September 11, 58% said they would agree | with the President deciding to go to war with Iraq even | without UN approval. Among those who believed that Iraq had | given al-Qaeda substantial support but was not involved in | September 11, support dropped to 37%. Among those who | believed that a few al-Qaeda individuals had contact with | Iraqi officials 32% were supportive, while just 25% felt | that way among those who believed that there was not | connection at all. | | | Pre-War (Feb 03) Approval for Unilateral Action and | Beliefs About al Qaeda Links | | Approve if President proceeds without UN approval | among those who believed: | | Iraq was directly involved in carrying out the | September 11th attacks | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 58% | | Iraq gave substantial support to al-Qaeda, but was | not involved in the September 11th attacks | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 37% | | A few al-Qaeda individuals visited Iraq or had | contact with Iraqi officials | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 32% | | There was no connection at all | XXXXXXXXXXXX 25% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | During the war, Americans who supported the war also said | that the supposed link was a major reason for supporting | going to war. An April poll for Investor's Business Daily | and the Christian Science Monitor asked the 72% who said | they supported the war to rate the importance of a number of | reasons for their support. "Iraq's connection with groups | like Al-Qaeda" was rated as a major reason by 80%. | | As discussed above, after the war nearly half of Americans | asked mistakenly believed | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 10 | | | evidence that Saddam Hussein was working closely with | al-Qaeda had been found. PIPA/KN found a strong relationship | between the belief that evidence of such links have been | found and support for the decision to go to war. Combining | data from June through September, among those with the | misperception, 67% held the view that going to war was the | best thing to do, while only 29% felt that way among those | who did not have the misperception. Among those without the | misperception, 52% said it was the wrong decision. [Note: | The question also offered respondents the option of saying | that they did not know if going to war was the best thing to | do, but nonetheless supported the President. Here and in | comparisons below we have limited our analysis to those who | took an unequivocal position in favor or against the | decision to go to war.] | | | Support for War and Misperception of Evidence of | Iraqi Links to al Qaeda | | (June ­ Sept 03) | | Support for going to war among those who believed: | | The US has found clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam | Hussein was working closely with the Al Qaeda | terrorist organization | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 67% | | The US has not | XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 29% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Just as before the war, in the postwar period there was also | a strong relationship between beliefs about the nature of | the connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq and support for the | war. Among those who believed that Saddam Hussein was | directly involved in September 11, 69% said going to war was | the best thing to do. Among those who believed that Iraq | had given al-Qaeda substantial support, but was not involved | in September 11, approval dropped to 54%. Among those who | believed that a few al-Qaeda individuals had contact with | Iraqi officials 39% were supportive, while just 11% felt | that way among those who believed that there was not | connection at all. | | Among those who believed that there was no connection at | all, 73% thought that going to war was the wrong decision. | | | Weapons of Mass Destruction | | The mistaken beliefs that WMD have been found in Iraq or | that Iraq used WMD in the war have been highly related to | support for the decision to go to war. Consolidating all | respondents asked by PIPA/KN in four polls conducted May | through September, among those who believed that WMD have | been found, 74% thought that going to war was the best | decision. Among those who did not have this misperception, | only 42% held this view. | | | Support for the War and Misperception Iraqi WMD | Found | | (May ­ Sept 03) | | Support for war among those who believed: | | US has found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 74% | | US has not found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 42% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Similarly, consolidating two polls conducted in May and | August-September, among those who believed that Iraq had | used chemical and biological weapons in the war, 64% said | they thought going to war was the best thing to do. Among | those who did not have this belief only 48% thought it was | the best thing. | | | World Public Opinion | | Perceptions of world public opinion on going to war with | Iraq have been significantly related to support for the war. | This has been true during and after the war. | | In the PIPA/KN poll conducted in late March, shortly after | the onset of the war, among those who wrongly believed that | the majority of the people in the world favored | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 11 | | | the US going to war with Iraq, an overwhelming 81% said they | agreed with the President's decision to go to war with Iraq, | despite his failure to garner UN Security Council approval. | Among those who, also incorrectly, believed that views were | evenly balanced on this question, 58% said they agreed. | Among those who correctly believed that the majority of | people opposed it, only 28% said they agreed with the | President's decision. | | When polled after the war (May-September) the pattern was | basically the same, though a different question was used to | measure support for the war. Among those who wrongly | believed that the majority of the people in the world favor | the US going to war with Iraq, 77% thought that going to war | was the best decision; among those who believed that views | were evenly balanced, 52% concurred; while among those who | correctly believed that the majority of people opposed it, | only 28% said they approved. | | | Support for War and Perceptions of World Public | Opinion | | Support for war among those who believed majority | world opinion: | | Favors US going to war | 3/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 81% | 6/03 ­ 9/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 77% | | Views are evenly balanced | 3/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 58% | 6/03 ­ 9/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 52% | | Opposes US going to war | 3/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 28% | 6/03 ­ 9/03 | XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 28% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Composite Analysis | | To determine the cumulative effect of various misperceptions | on support for the war, we analyzed those who had been asked | all of the three key misperception questions--whether | evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda have been found, | whether WMD have been found in Iraq, and whether world | public opinion favored the US going to war with Iraq--in | three polls conducted June through September. | | This revealed a strong cumulative effect. Among those with | none of the three misperceptions, only 23% support the war. | Among those with just one of the misperceptions, 53% | supported the war--rising to 78% for two of the | misperceptions and to 86% for those with all three. Among | those with none of the misperceptions, a majority said that | going to war was the wrong decision. | | | Support for War and Cumulative Effect of | Misperceptions | | Support for war among those who have: | | No misperceptions | XXXXXXXXXXX 23% | | Only 1 misperception | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 53% | | Only 2 misperceptions | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 78% | | All 3 misperceptions | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 86% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | Note: Misperceptions included were that evidence of Iraq-al | Qaeda links have been found, WMD have been found and world | public opinion favored Iraq war. | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 12 | | | Variations in Misperceptions According to Source of News | | The extent of Americans' misperceptions vary significantly | depending on their source of news. Those who receive most | of their news from Fox News are more likely than average to | have misperceptions. Those who receive most of their news | from NPR or PBS are less likely to have misperceptions. | These variations cannot simply be explained as a result of | differences in the demographic characteristics of each | audience, because these variations can also be found when | comparing the demographic subgroups of each audience. | | The widespread presence of misperceptions naturally raises | the question of whether they are to some extent a function | of an individual's source of news. In other words, did | people vary in the frequency of their misperceptions | according to their source of news? | | To find out, in three different PIPA/KN polls conducted in | June, July, and August-September, an aggregate sample of | 3,334 respondents was asked "Where do you tend to get most | of your news?" and offered the options of "newspapers and | magazines" or "TV and radio." Overall, 19% said they tend | to get most of their news from print media, while 80% said | they tend to get their news from TV and radio. Respondents | were then asked which network, if any, is their primary | source of news. Responses are shown below. | | Two or more networks ........................... 30% | Fox .............................................18 | CNN .............................................16 | NBC .............................................14 | ABC .............................................11 | CBS...............................................9 | PBS-NPR ..........................................3 | | The same respondents were also asked about their | perceptions. 1,362 respondents received all three | perception questions that identified the clearest cases of | misperception, i.e., the beliefs that evidence of links | between Iraq and al-Qaeda have been found, that WMD have | been found in Iraq and that world public opinion approved of | the US going to war with Iraq. | | | Composite Analysis | | Because it provides the best overview of the relationship | between media sources, we will first analyze the | relationship between media sources and the presence of | multiple misperceptions, to determine the variance in the | level of misperceptions according to the respondent's news | source. Afterward we will analyze the variance for specific | misperceptions. | | An analysis of those who were asked all of the key three | perception questions does reveal a remarkable level of | variation in the presence of misperceptions according to | news source. Standing out in the analysis are Fox and | NPR/PBS--but for opposite reasons. Fox was the news source | whose viewers had the most misperceptions. | | NPR/PBS are notable because their viewers and listeners | consistently held fewer misperceptions than respondents who | obtained their information from other news sources. | | The table below shows this clearly. Listed are the | breakouts of the sample according to the frequency of the | three key misperceptions (i.e. the beliefs that evidence of | links between Iraq and al-Qaeda have been found, that WMD | have been found in Iraq and that world public opinion | approved of the US going to war with Iraq) and their primary | news source. Fox News watchers were most likely to hold | misperceptions-- and were three times more likely than the | next nearest network to hold all three misperceptions. In | the audience for NPR/PBS, however, there was an overwhelming | majority who did not have any of the three misperceptions, | and hardly any had all three. | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 13 | | | Frequency of Misperceptions: | | Evidence of al-Qaeda Links, WMD Found, World Public | Opinion Favorable | | Respondents with one or more misperceptions | | Fox | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 80% | | CBS | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 71% | | ABC | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 61% | | NBC | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 55% | | CNN | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 55% | | Print media | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 47% | | PBS-NPR | XXXXXXXXXXX 23% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Number of Fox CBS ABC CNN NBC Print NPR/ | misperceptions media PBS | per respondent | | None of the 3 20% 30% 39% 45% 45% 53% 77% | | 1 or more 80 71 61 55 55 47 23 | misperceptions | | 2 or more 69 51 41 38 34 26 13 | misperceptions | | All 3 45 15 16 13 12 9 4 | misperceptions | | | To check these striking findings, we analyzed the data a | different way, using the larger sample of 3,334 who had | answered at least one of the three questions just mentioned. | For each misperception we determined how widespread it was | in each media audience (these will be discussed below), and | then for each media audience averaged this frequency for the | three misperceptions. The table below shows the averages | from lowest to highest. Again, the Fox News audience showed | the highest average rate of misperceptions--45%--while the | NPR/PBS audience showed the lowest--10%. | [Editors Correction: 11%, see table. -- Leif Erlingsson]. | | | News Source Average rate per misperception | | Fox 45% | CBS 36 | CNN 31 | ABC 30 | NBC 30 | Print media 25 | NPR/PBS 11 | | | Evidence of Links Between Iraq and Al Qaeda | | We will now look more closely at the presence of each | specific misperception. When asked whether the US has found | "clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working | closely with the al-Qaeda terrorist organization," among the | combined sample for the three-month period 49% said that | such evidence had been found. This misperception was | substantially higher among those who get their news | primarily from Fox--67%. Once again the NPR-PBS audience | was the lowest at 16%. | | | Evidence of Links Between Iraq and al-Qaeda | | Is it your impression that the US has or has not | found clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein | was working closely with the al Qaeda terrorist | organization? | | US has: | | Fox | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 67% | | CBS | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 56% | | NBC | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 49% | | CNN | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 48% | | ABC | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 45% | | Print media | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 40% | | PBS-NPR | XXXXXXXX 16% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 14 | | | Variations were much more modest on the perception that Iraq | was directly involved in September 11. (As discussed, the | view that Iraq was directly involved in September 11 is not | a demonstrable misperception, but it is widely regarded as | fallacious by the intelligence community.) In this case, | the highest level of misperceptions was in the CBS audience | (33%) followed by Fox (24%), ABC (23%), NBC (22%), and CNN | (21%). Respondents who got their news primarily from print | media (14%) and NPR or PBS (10%) were less likely to choose | this description. | | Combining the above group with those who had the less | egregious but still unproven belief that Iraq gave | substantial support to al-Qaeda, the pattern was similar. | Among CBS viewers 68% had one of these perceptions, as did | 66% of Fox viewers, 59% of NBC viewers, 55% of CNN viewers | and 53% of ABC viewers. Print readers were nearly as high | at 51%, while PBS-NPR audiences were significantly lower at | 28%. | | | Weapons of Mass Destruction | | As discussed, when respondents were asked whether the US has | "found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction" since the war had | ended, 22% of all respondents over June-September mistakenly | thought this had happened. Once again, Fox viewers were the | highest with 33% having this belief. A lower 19-23% of | viewers who watch ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN had the perception | that the US has found WMD. Seventeen percent of those who | primarily get their news from print sources had the | misperception, while only 11% of those who watch PBS or | listen to NPR had it. | | | Weapons of Mass Destruction | | Since the war with Iraq ended, is it your impression | that the US has or has not found Iraqi weapons of | mass destruction? | | US has: | | Fox | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 33% | | CBS | XXXXXXXXXXX 23% | | NBC | XXXXXXXXXX 20% | | CNN | XXXXXXXXXX 20% | | ABC | XXXXXXXXX 19% | | Print media | XXXXXXXX 17% | | PBS-NPR | XXXXX 11% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | World Public Opinion | | Respondents were also asked to give their impression of how | they think "people in the world feel about the US having | gone to war with Iraq." Over the three-month period, 25% of | all respondents said, incorrectly, that "the majority of | people favor the US having gone to war." Of Fox watchers, | 35% said this. Only 5% of those who watch PBS or listen to | NPR misperceived world opinion in this way. As usual, those | who primarily get their news from print media were the | second lowest, with 17% having this misperception. | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 15 | | | World Public Opinion | | Thinking about how all the people in the world feel | about the US having gone to war with Iraq, do you | think: | | The majority of people favor the US having gone to | war | | Fox News | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 35% | | CBS | XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 28% | | ABC | XXXXXXXXXXXXX 27% | | CNN | XXXXXXXXXXXX 24% | | NBC | XXXXXXXXXX 20% | | Print media | XXXXXXXX 17% | | PBS-NPR | XX 5% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Numerous respondents also chose the option of saying that in | world public opinion, views are evenly balanced between | favoring and opposing going to war--a misperception, though | less egregious. Combining those who said views were evenly | balanced with those who assumed that the majority favored | the Iraq war--a more inclusive definition of | misperception--the same pattern obtained. Fox viewers had | the highest level of misperceiving (69%) and PBS-NPR the | lowest (26%). The others also formed a familiar pattern: | CBS at 63%, ABC at 58%, NBC at 56%, CNN at 54%, and print | media at 45%. | | The same question was asked about European opinion. | Perceptions of European views are more accurate in the US | public: only 17% thought there had been majority support | among Europeans for the war. Over the three months, CBS | viewers most frequently misperceived European opinion (24%); | Fox viewers were second (20%). The NPR and PBS audience and | those relying on printed media were lowest--both at 13%. | | If one adds together those who thought there was European | majority support with those who thought views in Europe were | evenly balanced, 47% misperceived European opinion; CBS | viewers were highest at 56%, NBC and Fox viewers next at 52% | and 51% respectively; while the NPR and PBS audience was | lowest at 29%, and ABC viewers and those using print sources | were tied for second lowest at 41%. | | | The Effect of Demographic Variations in Audience | | Variations in misperceptions according to news source cannot | simply be explained as a result of differences in the | characteristics of each audience. It is true that some | audiences vary according to such demographics as party | identification and education--Fox viewers are more | Republican, PBS-NPR is higher in education and less | Republican, print readers are more educated, and CBS is less | educated and more Democratic. It is also true that | Republicans and those with lower education are more likely | to have misperceptions. However, controlling for these | demographic differences by examining the variations in | misperception within demographic groups reveals persisting | variations in the level of misperceptions according to news | source, consistent with the analysis above. | | Looking just at Republicans, the average rate for the three | key misperceptions was 43%. For Republican Fox viewers, | however the average rate was 54% while for Republicans who | get their news from PBS-NPR the average rate is 32%. This | same pattern obtains with Democrats and independents. | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 16 | | | Average Rate of Misperceptions Among Republicans | According to News Sources | | All Republicans | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 43% | | Republican Fox | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 54% | | Republican PBS-NPR | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 32% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Among those with a bachelor's degree or more, the average | rate of misperceptions was 27%. However among those who get | their news from print media the average rate was 20%, while | among those who get their news from PBS-NPR the average rate | was 10%. This pattern obtains at other educational levels | as well. | | CBS viewers are more unusual. Republican CBS viewers are | not significantly different from average on the three key | misperception questions, but Democratic CBS viewers are on | average 6% more likely to misperceive than other Democrats. | On the question of whether Saddam Hussein was directly | involved in 9/11, CBS viewers are higher than average at all | educational levels and all party identifications. | | | Misperceptions According to Level of Attention to News | | While it would seem that misperceptions are derived from a | failure to pay attention to the news, overall, those who pay | greater attention to the news are no less likely to have | misperceptions. Among those who primarily watch Fox, those | who pay more attention are more likely to have | misperceptions. Only those who mostly get their news from | print media, and to some extent those who primarily watch | CNN, have fewer misperceptions as they pay more attention. | | It would seem natural to assume that misperceptions are due | to a failure to pay attention to news and that those who | have greater exposure to news would have fewer | misperceptions. This was indeed the case with those | primarily get their news from print media. However, for | most media outlets, increased attention did not reduce the | likelihood of misperceptions. Most striking, in the case of | those who primarily watched Fox News, greater attention to | news modestly increases the likelihood of misperceptions. | | All respondents were asked: "How closely are you following | the news about the situation in Iraq now?" For the summer | as a whole (June, July, August-September), 56% said they | were following very (13%) or somewhat (43%) closely, while | 43% said they were following the situation not very closely | (29%) or not closely at all (14%). | | | Evidence of Al-Qaeda Link | | Looking at those who get their news primarily through radio | and television, for most, following the news more or less | closely had no reliable relation to whether respondents | believed clear evidence had been found that al-Qaeda and | Saddam Hussein were working closely together. Fox News was | the exception. Those who followed the news closely were far | more likely to have this misperception. Among those who did | not follow the news at all 42% had the misperception, rising | progressively at higher levels of attention to 80% among | those who followed the news very closely. | | On the other hand, those respondents who get their news | primarily from print sources were less likely to have this | misperception if they were following the Iraq situation more | closely. Of those not following the news closely, 49% had | the misperception--declining to 32% among those who followed | the news very closely. | | (The question--referred to elsewhere in this report--that | gave respondents four choices for characterizing the | relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was excluded from | this | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 17 | | | analysis of attention to news. The sample size was not | large enough to make such a complex analysis.) | | | Weapons of Mass Destruction | | Looking at those who get their news primarily through radio | and television, for most, following the news more or less | closely had no reliable relation to whether respondents | believed weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq. | Again, this was not the case for Fox viewers. For this | misperception, among Fox viewers, those who watched very | closely had the highest rate of misperception at 44%, while | the other levels of attention were lower, though they did | not form a clear pattern (not at all 34%, not very 24%, | somewhat 32%). Among the print audience, those that did not | follow the news at all were far more likely to misperceive | (35%) than the other levels (not very 14%, somewhat 18%, | very 13%). CNN viewers also showed a significant improvement | with greater attention, going from 11% and 18% among those | that followed the news very and somewhat closely | respectively, then dropping to 27% and 24% among those who | followed the news not very closely or not at all. | | | World Public Opinion | | Overall, those who paid higher levels of attention to the | news were not more likely to know that world public opinion | opposed the war against Iraq. But here again there were | exceptions. Among Fox viewers who did not follow the news | at all closely, 22% had this misperception, jumping to 34% | and 32% among those who followed the news not very and | somewhat closely respectively, and then jumping even higher | to 44% among those who followed the news very closely. | | Among the print audience, 25% of those that followed the | news not closely at all had the misperception, dropping to | 16% for all other categories. For CNN, only 11% of those | who followed the news very closely had this misperception, | while for those who followed the news not closely at all, | not very closely, and somewhat the percentages were 27%, | 28%, and 25% respectively. | | | Misperceptions According to Political Position | | The level of misperceptions varies according to Americans' | political positions. Supporters of the President are more | likely to have misperceptions. Republicans are also more | likely, but this appears to be a function of support for the | President. Misperceptions are not only the result of | political bias: a significant number of people who oppose | the president have misperceptions and within the groups that | support or oppose the President, misperceptions vary sharply | according to news source. | | The polls of June, July and August-September all included a | question placed near the end, asking whether the respondent | thought they would vote for Bush or for the Democratic | nominee in the presidential election. In all cases the | responses were very similar to those asked in numerous other | polls at the same times--showing either a slight edge for | Bush or a statistical tie. Only 10% did not answer the | question. When Bush supporters and supporters of a | Democratic nominee are compared, it is clear that supporters | of the president are more likely to have misperceptions than | those who oppose him. | | Republicans are also more likely to have misperceptions. | However, further analysis reveals that support for the | President is the critical factor, not Republican | identity--as this effect disappeared among Republicans once | support for the President was controlled for. | | | Support for the President | | Taking the averages of the percentage that had each of the | three key misperceptions--evidence of al-Qaeda links found, | WMD | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 18 | | | found, and world public opinion favors war--those that said | they would vote for the President were far more likely to | misperceive. On average, those who would vote for the | president held misperceptions 46% of the time, while those | who say they will vote for a Democrat misperceived, on | average, 17% of the time. | | | Support for President and Frequency of | Misperceptions | | Average frequency of key misperceptions among those | who plan to vote for: | | President George Bush | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 45% | | Democratic nominee | XXXXXXXX 17% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Evidence Of Al-Qaeda Link | | Looking at the specific cases, in response to the question | "Has the US found clear evidence Saddam Hussein was working | closely with al-Qaeda?" a strikingly large 68% of Bush | supporters believed that the US has found such evidence. On | the other side, an equally striking 66% of supporters of a | Democratic nominee knew that such evidence has not been | found. When asked to characterize the relationship between | the previous Iraqi government and al-Qaeda and given four | choices, 29% of Bush supporters said that "Iraq was directly | involved in the 9/11 attacks." Only 15% of Democrat | supporters chose this description. | | | Support for President and 3 Key Misperceptions | | Evidence of links to al Qaeda | Bush supporters | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 68% | Dem. supporters | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 31% | | WMD found | Bush supporters | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 31% | Dem. supporters | XXXXX 10% | | World public opinion favorable | Bush supporters | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 36% | Dem. supporters | XXXXX 11% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Weapons of Mass Destruction | | Only minorities of either Bush supporters or supporters of a | Democratic nominee believe that the US has found evidence of | weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. However, nearly three | times as many Bush supporters as Democrat supporters hold | this misperception. Thirty-one percent of Bush supporters | think the US has found such evidence, while only 10% of | Democrat supporters think this. | | | World Public Opinion | | When asked "How do you think the people of the world feel | about the US having gone to war with Iraq?" Bush supporters | were almost four times more likely than supporters of a | Democratic nominee to mistakenly believe that "the majority | of people favor the US having gone to war." Thirty-six | percent of Bush supporters had this misperception, while | only 11% of Democrat supporters did. | | The PIPA/KN polls asked the same question about Europe--on | which misperceptions are less widespread among Americans. | Twenty-six percent of Bush supporters mistakenly thought | that a majority of Europeans favored the war, while only 7% | of supporters of a Democratic nominee believed this. | | | Party Identification | | Republicans are also more likely than Democrats or | independents to have misperceptions. However, when the | analysis controls for support for the President, this party | difference largely disappears. For example, among Bush | supporters, Republicans, Democrats and independents were | similarly likely to believe that the US has found clear | evidence that Saddam Hussein was working closely with | al-Qaeda (pro-Bush Republicans 68%, pro-Bush Democrats 77%, | pro-Bush independents 66%). On whether the US has found | evidence of weapons of mass destruction, the same pattern | among Bush | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 19 | | | supporters was present (31% of pro-Bush Republicans | believing such evidence has been found, 29% of pro-Bush | Democrats believing this, and 30% of pro-Bush independents | believing this). The same pattern appeared in all cases | tested. Thus, having misperceptions is much more a function | of being a Bush supporter than party preference. | | | Political Bias Not Full Explanation | | It is tempting to assume that political bias can explain | variations in misperceptions and can account for variations | in those who get their news from various news sources. | However, this idea is contradicted by the data on several | fronts. | | Supporters of a Democratic nominee also have significant | misperceptions. Almost a third--31%--did believe that the | US has found clear evidence Saddam Hussein was working | closely with al-Qaeda. If this misperception was simply a | function of a political position, one would not find it held | by such a large proportion of those who do not intend to | vote for Bush. | | Also, while Bush supporters are more likely than supporters | of a Democratic nominee to have misperceptions, for both | groups, respondents' choices of a news source make a | significant difference in how prevalent misperceptions are. | For example, 78% of Bush supporters who watch Fox News | thought the US has found evidence of a direct link to | al-Qaeda, but only 50% of Bush supporters in the PBS and NPR | audience thought this. On the other side, 48% of Democrat | supporters who watch Fox News thought the US has found | evidence of a direct link to al-Qaeda, but not one single | respondent who is a Democrat supporter and relies on PBS and | NPR for network news thought the US had found such evidence. | | | Variation in Misperception by Support for President | and News Source | | Frequency of misperception that evidence of links to | al Qaeda have been found among: | | Bush supporters who watch: | Fox | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 78% | PBS-NPR | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 50% | | Democratic nominee supporters who watch: | Fox | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 48% | PBS-NPR | 0% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Compounding Effects of News Exposure and Political Positions | | Higher levels of exposure to news compound the effect of | political positions on the frequency of misperceptions and | support for the war. Among those who say they will vote for | the President, those with higher exposure to news are more | likely to misperceive and to support the war. The opposite | is true for those who say they will vote for a Democratic | nominee: those with higher exposure to news are less likely | to misperceive and to support the war. | | Higher exposure to news compounds the effect of political | positions on the frequency of misperceptions. Taking the | average level of the three key misperceptions--evidence that | al-Qaeda links have been found, WMD have been found, world | public opinion approves of the war--those who say they will | vote for Bush and have higher levels of exposure to news are | more likely to misperceive. Among Bush supporters who say | they follow the news "not at all," on average, 40% | misperceive. This rises to an average of 54% misperceiving | among those who follow the news very closely. | | The opposite dynamic occurs for those who say that they will | vote for a Democratic nominee. Among Democratic supporters | who do not pay attention at all, an average of 22% | misperceive. At higher levels of attention, misperceptions | drop, so that among those who follow the news very closely | only an average of 11% misperceive. | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 20 | | | Exposure to News and Frequency of Misperceptions | Among Bush and Democratic Nominee Supporters | | Average frequency of misperception among: | | Bush supporters who follow the news | | Not closely at all | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 40% | | Not very closely | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 43% | | Somewhat closely | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 44% | | Very closely | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 54% | | Democratic nominee supporters who follow the news: | | Not closely at all | XXXXXXXXXXX 22% | | Not very closely | XXXXXXXXXX 20% | | Somewhat closely | XXXXXXXX 16% | | Very closely | XXXXX 11% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | Looking specifically at the misperception on evidence of | links to al Qaeda, among those who favored Bush and did not | follow the news closely at all, 57% had this | misperception--rising with each higher level of attention to | 74% among those who followed the news closely. Among | supporters of the Democratic nominee who did not follow the | news very closely, 35% had the misperception, dropping | progressively with greater attention to 22% among those in | this group who followed the news very closely. | | The misperception that WMD have been found follows a similar | pattern. Among those who favored Bush and did not follow | the news closely at all, 29% had this misperception. This | rate stayed the same at increasing levels of attention, and | then jumped to 44% among those who followed the news very | closely. Among supporters of the Democratic nominee that | did not follow the news closely at all, 18% had the | misperception--dropping progressively to just 4% among those | who followed the news very closely. | | Among Bush supporters who did not follow the news closely at | all, 34% believed that world public opinion favored the | war--once again staying flat at higher levels of attention | and then jumping to 43% at the highest level of attention. | Democratic supporters who did not follow the news closely at | all had a 14% misperception rate on world public opinion, | dropping progressively to 8%. | | | Support for the War | | Support for the war also follows this same pattern. Among | those who say they will vote for the President, support for | the war rises as they pay more attention to the news (and, | apparently, have more misperceptions), going from 53% among | those who do not follow the news closely at all to 86% among | those who follow the news very closely. For those who say | they will vote for a Democratic nominee, support drops only | slightly with higher levels of attention from 26% to 19%, | but those saying it was the wrong decision rise sharply from | 47% to 72%. | | | Exposure to News and Support for War Among Bush and | Democratic Nominee Supporters | | Support for going to war among: | | Bush supporters who follow the news: | | Not closely at all | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 53% | | Not very closely | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 67% | | Somewhat closely | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 76% | | Very closely | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 86% | | Democratic nominee supporters who follow the news: | | Not closely at all | XXXXXXXXXXXXX 26% | | Not very closely | XXXXXXXXXXXX 25% | | Somewhat closely | XXXXXXXXXXX 23% | | Very closely | XXXXXXXXX 19% | | PIPA/KN 10/03 | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | Misperceptions, The Media and The Iraq War October 2, 2003 | page 21 | | | METHODOLOGY | | The poll was fielded by Knowledge Networks, a polling, | social science, and market research firm in Menlo Park, | California, with a randomly selected sample of its | large-scale nationwide research panel. This panel is itself | randomly selected from the national population of households | having telephones and subsequently provided internet access | for the completion of surveys (and thus is not limited to | those who already have internet access). The distribution | of the sample in the web-enabled panel closely tracks the | distribution of United States Census counts for the US | population on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical | region, employment status, income, education, etc. | | The panel is recruited using stratified random-digit-dial | (RDD) telephone sampling. RDD provides a non-zero | probability of selection for every US household having a | telephone. Households that agree to participate in the panel | are provided with free Web access and an Internet appliance, | which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and | uses the television as a monitor. In return, panel members | participate in surveys three to four times a month. Survey | responses are confidential, with identifying information | never revealed without respondent approval. When a survey is | fielded to a panel member, he or she receives an e-mail | indicating that the survey is available for completion. | Surveys are self-administered. | | For more information about the methodology, please go to: | http://knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/ . [Editor: See document | describing the methodologies at http://propaganda.lege.net/ | misperceptions/report/knowledgenetworks_methods.pdf | -- Leif Erlingsson] | | | PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES / KNOWLEDGE | NETWORKS | ____________________________________________________________ | | | | Source: | http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Media_10_02_03_Report.pdf | | | | A version of this page suitable for email can be downloaded | here: | http://propaganda.lege.net/misperceptions/report/misperceptions_report.txt | | A pdf version of this page can be downloaded here: | http://propaganda.lege.net/misperceptions/report/misperceptions_report.pdf | | The questionnaire can be downloaded here: | http://propaganda.lege.net/misperceptions/report/misperceptions_questionnaire.pdf | [ Source: | http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Media_10_02_03_Questionnaire.pdf ] | | The press release can be downloaded here: | http://propaganda.lege.net/misperceptions/report/misperceptions_press.pdf | [ Source: | http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Media_10_02_03_Press.pdf ] | | A document describing the methodologies used by Knowledge | Networks can be downloaded here: | http://propaganda.lege.net/misperceptions/report/knowledgenetworks_methods.pdf | [ Source: | http://knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/gen_kn_methods08202003.pdf ] | | | An article about this study can be found from this page: | http://propaganda.lege.net/misperceptions/ | | Resources: | http://propaganda.lege.net/resources/ | |______________________________________________________________